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AUTOPSY REPORTS AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: A
PRESUMPTION OF ADMISSIBILITY
Daniel J. Capra and Joseph Tartakovsky
ABSTRACT
Courts nationwide are divided over whether autopsy
reports are “testimonial” under the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause. Resolving that split will affect
medical examiners as dramatically as Miranda did police.
This article applies the latest Supreme Court jurisprudence
to the work of modern medical examiners in a
comprehensive inquiry. It argues that autopsy reports
should be presumed non-testimonial—a presumption
overcome only by a showing that law enforcement
involvement materially influenced the examiner’s autopsy
report.
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INTRODUCTION: UNDER DEBATE
IN COURTS NATIONWIDE

I

n 2004, the Supreme Court, in Crawford v. Washington, restored the
“original meaning” of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.1
The framers of that clause—which guarantees a criminal defendant the
right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him”—meant to outlaw
the old-world practice of condemning men through ghost accusers who
couldn’t be cross-examined at trial.2 We get a vivid sense of the
inquisitorial terror that doomed Sir Walter Raleigh in the political
persecutions that persist in the lands of unliberty. In summer 2013,
Russian oppositionist Aleksei Navalny was sentenced to five years’
imprisonment, largely on the testimony of a man named Opalev. “[D]uring
the trial,” the New York Times reported, Opalev “gave contradictory
evidence, and defense lawyers were not allowed to cross-examine him.”3
Crawford firmed up the right in favor of criminal defendants but,
as with most major constitutional decisions, it raised as many questions as
it answered.4 One of the most important is whether the Confrontation

1

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004).
Id. at 50 (“[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was
the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte
examinations as evidence against the accused”); id. at 56 (“Involvement of government
officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential
for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time and again throughout a history with which
the Framers were keenly familiar.”).
3
David M. Herszenhorn, Russian Court Convicts Opposition Leader, N.Y. T IMES,
July 18, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/world/europe /russiancourt-convicts-opposition-leader-aleksei-navalny.html?pagewanted=print.
4
Specifically, Crawford replaced the sometimes flimsy test of Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 66 (1980), which held that the Confrontation Clause allowed admission of any
out-of-court statement that fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or that
possessed “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”
2
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Clause applies with full rigor to autopsy reports offered for their truth.5
There are two views. On one side is the argument that autopsy reports are
prepared by neutral pathologists—highly trained specialists who are
effectively separate from law enforcement, working under a statutory duty
to determine the cause of unusual deaths.6 Their reports can appear in
prosecutions, but the vast majority do not. To require these impartial
M.D.s to testify imposes a massive, pointless burden on them and serves
to bar or undermine just prosecutions because autopsy evidence is soon
lost and often impossible to recreate.
On the other side is the argument that autopsy reports are a formal
record, created sometimes at police behest, by state agents who practically
function as an arm of law enforcement. Autopsies, far from being a
reading on some machine, are the product of human skill and judgment.
The defendant, as with any other formalized testimony, should be able to
test for fraud or incompetence. Pathologists are “witnesses” against the
accused.
The issue here usually arises when an autopsy report is offered in
evidence or testified to by a colleague who was not its author.7 If the
5

See, e.g., Euceda v. United States, 66 A.3d 994, 1012-13 (D.C. 2013) (observing
that courts “continue to be split on this question”); People v. Lewis, 806 N.W.2d 295
(Mich. 2011) (“[W]hether admission of the contents of an autopsy report through
testimony of a medical examiner who did not prepare the report constitutes inadmissible
testimonial hearsay . . . is a jurisprudentially significant question that has divided courts
across the country.”). The Supreme Court has declined to grant cert petitions raising this
question. E.g., Craig v. Ohio, 549 U.S. 1255 (2007) (denying certiorari where question
presented was: “Is an autopsy report used in a murder prosecution a testimonial statement
within the meaning of Crawford”); see Pet. for Writ of Cert., Craig v. Ohio, 127 S. Ct.
1374 (Dec. 19, 2006) (No. 06-8490).
6
We refer to “autopsies” or “examinations” interchangeably and mean for the
discussion to apply to autopsies, external examinations, and medical file reviews alike.
We refer variously to “pathologists,” “doctors,” and “medical examiners” with the same
people in mind.
7
See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905, 917 (W. Va. 2012) (allowing a Dr.
Sabet to give testimony based on autopsy report prepared by Dr. Livingston); State v.
Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621, 637 (Ohio 2006) (allowing Dr. Lisa Kohler, Summit County
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report is “testimonial,” it cannot be admitted into evidence unless the
author testifies (or did so previously, under cross-examination).
Depending on how you read recent Supreme Court cases, a different
testifying expert may not even be able to rely on that report. 8 If the
examiner dies or retires or moves away, the answer to this question often
determines whether the case goes on. We think autopsy reports can be
non-testimonial—and often are. As the studios say, it’s an issue coming
soon to a supreme court near you.
I. THE STATE OF CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
A. CRAWFORD (2004)
Crawford is what is usually referred to as a “landmark” decision.
That term once referred to a conspicuous object that guided wayfarers and
ships at sea. For the intrepid adventurers at the bar, however, the more
prominent theme since Crawford has been misdirection and confusion.9
Justice Scalia wrote Crawford but a few years later pronounced
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence “in a shambles.”10 Or as the California
medical examiner, to testify using autopsy report of Dr. Roberto Ruiz); State v. Lackey,
120 P.3d 332, 341 (Kan. 2005) (allowing Dr. Mitchell to testify using Dr. Eckert’s
report); People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 445 (N.M. 2012) (allowing Dr. Lawrence’s to
testify using Dr. Bolduc’s autopsy report).
8
See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2228 (2012), discussed below in II.C.
9
See, e.g., State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 437 (N.M. 2013) (“What constitutes a
testimonial statement is not easily discernable from a review of Crawford”); Kennedy,
735 S.E.2d at 916 (“[W]e believe Williams cannot be fairly read to supplant the ‘primary
purpose’ test previously endorsed by the Court and as established in Melendez–Diaz and
Bullcoming.”); United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 94 (2d Cir. 2013) (relying on
Melendez-Diaz, Bryant, and Bullcoming¸ but finding Williams inconclusive enough to
rely on for a clear principle); State v. Shivers, 280 P.3d 635, 637 (Az. Ct. App. 2012)
(acknowledging the Clause’s “choppy waters”).
10
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1168 (2011). In Bullcoming the majority
claimed that the dissent “makes plain that its objection is less to the application of the
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Supreme Court put it, with admirable delicacy, the Clause presents
“complexities that are far from easy to resolve in light of the widely
divergent views expressed by the justices of the United States Supreme
Court.”11
In Crawford, the defendant was tried for assault and attempted
murder; the state introduced an inculpatory tape-recording of his wife
Sylvia (not present at trial) speaking to police in a station-house
interrogation. The Court declared this impermissible, even though lower
courts had found Sylvia’s statement reliable under the then-applicable
constitutional jurisprudence. “[T]he Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure
reliability of evidence,” wrote the Court, “but it is a procedural rather than
a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but
that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible
of cross-examination.”12 Only “testimonial” evidence triggered the
Clause’s application—this was the key.13 Justice Scalia continued:
We leave for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of “testimonial.” Whatever else
the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony
at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former
trial; and to police interrogations. These are the modern
practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed.14

Court’s decisions in Crawford and Melendez–Diaz to this case than to those pathmarking
decisions themselves.” Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714 n.5.
11
People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 447 (Cal. 2012), as modified on denial of reh’g
(Dec. 12, 2012).
12
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
13
See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) (“A critical portion of
this holding, and the portion central to resolution of the two cases now before us, is the
phrase ‘testimonial statements.’ Only statements of this sort cause the declarant to be a
‘witness’ within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.”).
14
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
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B. MELENDEZ-DIAZ (2009) AND BULLCOMING (2011)
The applicability of the Crawford regime to forensic reports was
addressed in Melendez-Diaz in 2009. Could Massachusetts introduce three
“certificates of analysis” from a state lab, created at police request,
establishing that a trafficker’s seized substances were in fact cocaine?15
The answer, wrote Justice Scalia, was “No”:
The documents at issue here, while denominated by
Massachusetts law “certificates,” are quite plainly
affidavits: declarations of facts written down and sworn to
by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer
oaths. . . . [They] are functionally identical to live, in-court
testimony, doing precisely what a witness does on direct
examination.16
The certificates did not “directly accuse petitioner of wrongdoing,”
but that was irrelevant.17 What mattered was that they “provided testimony
against petitioner, proving one fact necessary for his conviction—that the
substance he possessed was cocaine.”18 The Court was not swayed by the
claim that the analysts were not “typical” of the witnesses that most
acutely concerned the framers .19 The questions of autopsies came up—
“whatever the status of coroner’s reports at common law in England,” the
Court noted, “they were not accorded any special status in American
practice.”20 The autopsy issue was clearly in the offing.21
15

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308 (2009).
Id. at 310-11 (citations and brackets omitted).
17
Id. at 313-14.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 315.
20
Id. at 322.
21
The Court mentioned autopsies twice. It noted that there are other ways to test
forensic evidence, but paused to add: “Though surely not always. Some forensic
analyses, such as autopsies and breathalyzer tests, cannot be repeated.” Id. at 557 U.S. at
318 n.5.
16
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In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, two years on, the issue was whether
a lab analyst’s blood-alcohol report could be admitted, without
confrontation, to convict Donald Bullcoming of drunk driving. “In all
material respects,” wrote Justice Ginsburg, it was Melendez–Diaz redux:
“a law-enforcement officer provided seized evidence to a state laboratory
required by law to assist in police investigations.”22 This testimonial
analysis could not be introduced by a “surrogate” from the lab who knew
the procedures but did not “perform or observe the test.”23 The report had
“information filled in by the arresting officer,” like the “reason the suspect
was stopped”24 and an officer’s affirmation that he “arrested Bullcoming
and witnessed the blood draw.”25
Carolyn Zabrycki, now a California prosecutor, claimed in an
article written four years after Crawford that, despite the confusion created
by the decision, “one type of statement has, so far, garnered consensus:
autopsy reports.”26 Melendez-Diaz disrupted all that.27 A number of
federal and state courts have since found autopsy reports testimonial,
usually reasoning, as did the Eleventh Circuit, that the reports do
“precisely what a witness does on direct examination.”28
22

Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2011).
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709-10.
24
Id. at 2710 (citations omitted).
25
Id. at 2710.
26
Carolyn Zabrycki, Toward A Definition of “Testimonial”: How Autopsy Reports
Do Not Embody the Qualities of A Testimonial Statement, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1093, 1099
(2008). For this proposition she cited, id. at 1138, United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d
121, 132 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 229 (2d Cir. 2006); Smith
v. State, 898 So. 2d 907, 916 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); State v. Lackey, 120 P.3d 332,
351-52 (Kan. 2005); Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 844-45 (Md. 2006); People v. Durio,
794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 869 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); State v. Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621, 639 (Ohio
2006); Moreno Denoso v. State, 156 S.W.3d 166, 182 (Tex. App. 2005).
27
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 335, 339, 346 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
28
United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 1230 (citations and brackets omitted). In
addition to the cases cited below, see also State v. Locklear, 681 N.E.2d 293, 304-305
(N.C. 2009); Wood v. State, 299 S.W.3d 200, 208-210 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009); State v.
23
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C. WILLIAMS (2012)
Finally, in 2012 came Williams v. Illinois, a long, confusing
exhibition involving a state expert who referred at trial to a DNA “profile”
created by the private lab Cellmark that allowed her to match up defendant
Sandy Williams’s blood and semen samples.29 A plurality led by Justice
Alito, with the Chief and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, held that the
Cellmark “statements” weren’t the “sort of extrajudicial statements” that
the Clause barred.30 The statements were “sought not for the purpose of
obtaining evidence to be used against petitioner, who was not even under
suspicion at the time, but for the purpose of finding a rapist who was on
the loose.”31 (The Court also ruled that the Cellmark statements were
related by the expert “solely for the purpose of explaining the assumptions
on which that opinion rests,” and so were “not offered for their truth.”32
This article argues that underlying reports themselves are usually
admissible under the Confrontation Clause without resort to the “not-fortruth” device.)

Davidson, 242 S.W.3d 409, 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (finding an autopsy report
testimonial because prepared at request of law enforcement in anticipation of murder
prosecution and offered to prove cause of death); Martinez v. State, 311 S.W.3d 104, 111
(Tex. Ct. App. 2010) (concluding an autopsy report is testimonial when primary purpose
is to establish past events, demonstrated by officer’s presence and picture-taking at
autopsy and where statutory basis for autopsy was suspicion of death by unlawful
means). Courts have also come out the other way. We cite the main cases below, but see
also Banmah v. State, 87 So.3d 101, 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (asserting that
autopsy reports are non-testimonial since prepared pursuant to statutory duty and not
solely for use in prosecution); People v. Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d 428, 431-432 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2011) (holding that autopsy reports are not testimonial under Confrontation Clause).
29
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227, 2229 (2012).
30
Id. at 2228.
31
Id.
32
Id.
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Justice Breyer, in a separate opinion (clearly speaking for the rest
of the plurality), said he would adhere to the dissent in Melendez-Diaz.33
The Confrontation Clause worked to disallow ex parte accusations; the
need for cross-examination is “considerably diminished” with a statement
made by an “accredited laboratory employee operating at a remove from
the investigation in the ordinary course of professional work.”34 So
anxious was Justice Breyer about the looming question of autopsies that
he felt obliged to address it, though not part of the case. The majority’s
rule, he said, could bar “reliable case-specific technical information like
autopsy reports”:
Autopsies, like the DNA report in this case, are often
conducted when it is not yet clear whether there is a
particular suspect or whether the facts found in the autopsy
will ultimately prove relevant in a criminal trial. Autopsies
are typically conducted soon after death. And when, say, a
victim’s body has decomposed, repetition of the autopsy
may not be possible. What is to happen if the medical
examiner dies before trial? Is the Confrontation Clause
effectively to function as a statute of limitations for
murder?35
A dissenting Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg,
and Sotomayor—in a tense opinion that referenced Nazis and the plurality
in the same breath36—argued that the Confrontation Clause, plain and

33

Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2248 (Breyer, J., concurring). See also Bullcoming, 131 S.
Ct. at 2723 (“Whether or not one agrees with the reasoning and the result in Melendez–
Diaz, the Court today takes the new and serious misstep of extending that holding”)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
34
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2249 (Breyer, J., concurring).
35
Id. at 2251 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
36
Justice Kagan wrote that “Melendez–Diaz made yet a more fundamental point in
response to claims of the über alles reliability of scientific evidence….” Williams, 132 S.
Ct. at 2275. “Über alles” (“over all”) appeared in the opening line of the Nazi national
anthem (“Deutschland, Deutschland, über alles”) and became a shorthand for the song,
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simple, “applies with full force to forensic evidence of the kind involved”
in the case.37 After all, “[c]ross-examination of the analyst is especially
likely to reveal whether vials have been switched, samples contaminated,
tests incompetently run, or results inaccurately recorded.”38 Given the lack
of majority support for any particular line of reasoning in the slip
opinions, the decisions in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, in Justice
Kagan’s view, remained the law.39 Finally, for Justice Thomas—in the
unwonted position of swing vote—the touchstone was form: a statement is
testimonial only when it has the “solemnity of an affidavit or deposition,”
even if “produced at the request of law enforcement.”40
II. WHY AUTOPSIES ARE DIFFERENT
A. THE CENTRALITY OF “PRIMARY PURPOSE”
After Williams all nine Justices agree on using some sort of
“primary purpose” test to determine testimoniality, observed the
California Supreme Court, but they split over “what the statement’s
primary purpose must be.”41 The Alito plurality in Williams says the
primary purpose, to qualify as testimonial, must be “accusing a targeted

which was sufficiently associated with Hitler that the postwar republic outlawed the
verse.
37
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2264-65 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting). See also id. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“I
call Justice Alito's opinion ‘the plurality,’ because that is the conventional term for it. But
in all except its disposition, his opinion is a dissent: Five Justices specifically reject every
aspect of its reasoning and every paragraph of its explication.”); see also Dungo, 286
P.3d at 465.
40
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring).
41
People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 477 (Cal. 2012).
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individual.”42 The Kagan dissenters insist that a statement is testimonial
when it “establish[es] past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.”43 Justice Thomas dislikes the primary/non-primary
distinction altogether, but agrees that a testimonial declarant “must
primarily intend to establish some fact with the understanding that his
statement may be used in a criminal prosecution.”44
In Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana,45 police took
statements from women beaten by their partners. In Davis, Michelle
McCottry called 911 and reported an attack nearly as it happened: “He’s
here jumpin’ on me again . . . . He’s usin’ his fists.”46 In Hammon, Amy
Hammon told police who arrived on the scene that her husband “[h]it me
in the chest and threw me down,” and, in a separate room, separated from
her husband, signed an affidavit.47 The first statement was non-testimonial
because “circumstances objectively indicat[ed] that the primary purpose of
the interrogation [was] to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency.”48 But the second was testimonial because there was no such
emergency and the primary purpose of the “interrogation” was to establish
“past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”49 The test
made clear that in some cases, like Ms. McCottry’s, even inculpatory
42

Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243. Two paragraphs later there is a slight rephrasing: a
statement is testimonial when it is the “equivalent of affidavits made for the purpose of
proving the guilt of a particular criminal defendant at trial.” Id.
43
Id. at 2273 (Kagan, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, JJ.)
(quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).
44
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2261 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Bryant, 131 S. Ct.
at 1167 (Thomas, J. concurring).
45
Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
46
Id. at 817.
47
Id. at 820.
48
Id. at 822.
49
Id. Judge Ethan Greenberg of New York put it most eloquently: “A testimonial
statement is produced when the government summons a citizen to be a witness; in a 911
call, it is the citizen who summons the government to her aid.” People v. Moscat, 777
N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (Bronx Crim. Ct. 2004).
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statements almost certain to come out at trial could nonetheless not
constitute the sort of statement that implicates the Confrontation Clause.50
In Michigan v. Bryant the Court said that emergency was just one
possible “factor” in the inquiry.51 “[C]ourts making a ‘primary purpose’
assessment,” we were told, “should not be unjustifiably restrained from
consulting all relevant information.”52 Non-testimonial primary purposes
so far recognized include seeking medical attention (Bryant),53 requesting
aid in a 911 call (Davis),54 catching a dangerous rapist of unknown
identity (Williams plurality),55 promising aid in a conspiracy (United
States v. Farhane, Second Circuit),56 or requesting patient records (United
States v. Bourlier, Eleventh Circuit).57 Declarants may have multiple
purposes, too.58 You can report a body stuffed into a dumpster from
sanitary motives, though not entirely without some suspicion of crime
afoot.
A perceptive statement of the test (blending language from
Melendez-Diaz and Bryant) was expressed by Judge Robert Sack in
50

Davis, 547 U.S. at 825, said that other “clearly nontestimonial” statements
included unwitting statements to government informants, Bourjaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171, 181-84 (1987), and statements from one prisoner to another, Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74, 87-89 (1970).
51
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160 (2011) (“As Davis made clear, whether
an ongoing emergency exists is simply one factor—albeit an important factor—that
informs the ultimate inquiry regarding the ‘primary purpose’ of an interrogation.”).
Justice Scalia had to concede that the Crawford analysis was “something of a multifactor
balancing test,” using three undoubtedly hateful words to him. Id. at 1176 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
52
Id. at 1162.
53
Id. at 1157.
54
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
55
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243.
56
United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 131-32, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2011).
57
United States v. Bourlier, 518 Fed.Appx. 848, 856 (11th Cir. 2013).
58
See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1161 (noting “problem of mixed motives on the part of
both interrogators and declarants.”).
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United States v. James: a “statement triggers the protections of the
Confrontation Clause when it is made with the primary purpose of
creating a record for use a later criminal trial.”59 The Supreme Court has
struggled to work out a definition of “testimonial,”60 but it has given us a
way of making that determination. Under that inquiry, modern autopsy
reports, in our view, are usually non-testimonial. Our conclusion is not
that there is an “autopsy exception,” but rather that when an autopsy report
is written under conditions like those outlined in Part IV, it simply does
not come within the prohibition. It’s not a matter of “indicia of reliability”
or the evidence’s importance. It’s about the reasons we perform autopsies:
the primary purpose is ordinarily not to create a record for use at a later
criminal trial.

59

James, 712 F.3d at 96, citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310–11; Bryant, 131 S.
Ct. at 1155. In Bryant, the Court spoke of “a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court
substitute for trial testimony.” Id. at 1155. In Bullcoming, the Court wrote that “[t]o rank
as ‘testimonial,’ a statement must have a ‘primary purpose’ of ‘establish[ing] or prov[ing]
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’” Id., 131 S. Ct. at 2714,
citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 82. State courts use different phrasings, often with subtle but
crucial omissions. For instance, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in State v.
Kennedy, 229 W. Va. 756, 766 (W. Va. 2012), offered a similar test but omitting the
“primary purpose” language in a way that echoes Justice Kagan’s dissent in Williams: “a
testimonial statement is, generally, a statement that is made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial.” The California Supreme Court said a “statement is
testimonial only if its primary purpose pertains in some fashion to a criminal
prosecution.” Dungo, 286 P.3d at 449.
60
We assume the battle is lost on the attempt by the Melendez-Diaz dissenters to put
the focus not on the quality of being “testimonial” but on the “witness,” the word the
clause actually uses. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 343-44 (“Laboratory analysts are not
‘witnesses against’ the defendant as those words would have been understood at the
framing . . . . Instead, the Clause refers to a conventional ‘witness’—meaning one who
witnesses (that is, perceives) an event that gives him or her personal knowledge of some
aspect of the defendant’s guilt.”).
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B. APPLYING THE “PRIMARY PURPOSE” TEST TO AUTOPSIES
In July 2013, San Mateo County Coroner Robert Foucrault
announced that a 16-year-old girl on an Asiana Airlines flight that crashed
in San Francisco died from blunt-injury trauma.61 She was hit by a fire
truck. It seems safe to conclude that Foucrault was not animated by a
desire to flesh out a D.A.’s case for criminal negligence against
firefighters or to supply facts for a federal air-safety indictment against the
pilots. He was motivated by a duty he has under a California statute to
determine cause of death. Police did not instigate his report and it may
never be used in a criminal trial. It happens that police were involved in
the creation of the challenged evidence in every Supreme Court
confrontation case discussed above: Crawford, Melendez-Diaz,
Bullcoming, Davis, Bryant, Williams. Many courts hold that police
involvement is even a prerequisite to testimoniality.62 So generally how
involved are police with autopsies?
Pathologists today operate under statutes setting out their
responsibilities. In Florida, for instance, twelve situations legally trigger
autopsies, among them “criminal violence,” “accident,” “suicide,” death
occurring “[s]uddenly, when in apparent good health,” or “disease
constituting a threat to public health.”63 The New York City Office of the
61

Robert Salonga & Joshua Melvin, SFO crash: Coroner says Asiana crash victim
died after firetruck ran over her, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 19, 2013, available at
www.mercurynews.com/bay-area-news/ci_23692596/coroner-reveal-cause-asianapassenger-death.
62
See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 509 F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 2007) (“To our
knowledge, no court has extended Crawford to statements made by a declarant to friends
or associates.”).
63
Fla. Stat. § 406.11(1)(a)-(c) (West 2006). Most states seem to have variations on
this. New Mexico, for instance, provides: “When any person comes to a sudden, violent
or untimely death or is found dead and the cause of death is unknown, anyone who
becomes aware of the death shall report it immediately to law enforcement authorities or
the office of the state or district medical investigator.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-11-5 (West
1978).
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Chief Medical Examiner “performs autopsies where people died in
unexpected circumstances, unnatural deaths.”64 California’s code adds
“unattended deaths” and enumerates modes of demise like a grim book of
fate: “deaths due to drowning, fire, hanging, gunshot, stabbing, cutting,
exposure, starvation, acute alcoholism, drug addiction, strangulation,
aspiration, or . . . sudden infant death syndrome.”65
Autopsies, to be sure, can be the crux of a murder prosecution. In
People v. Dungo,66 Reynaldo Dungo claimed he strangled his girlfriend in
the “heat of passion”67—voluntary manslaughter at most, argued his
lawyer.68 But the autopsy revealed that she was asphyxiated for “more
than two minutes.”69 The jury knew it was no sudden impulse.70
But most autopsies do not lead to criminal investigations. New
York City’s medical examiner performs an average of 5,500 autopsies a
year, but in 2010 only 533 city residents had homicide as their cause of
death.71 Not every homicide results in a criminal trial, moreover, so this
means less than 10% of autopsy reports could possibly appear in a
prosecution. In 2004 the Los Angeles Medical Examiner’s office took
64

James, 712 F.3d at 96 (citations omitted).
Cal. Gov. Code § 27491 (West 1969).
66
55 Cal.4th 608, 286 P.3d 442 (2012).
67
Id. at 446.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 451.
70
Id. at 446. This case has the perhaps the best full-throated statements of why
autopsy statements are not testimonial. Id. at 451-55 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
71
James, 712 F.3d at 99 n.10 (citing OCME, General Information Booklet,
http://www. nyc.gov/html/ocme/downloads/pdf/General% 20Information/OCME%
20General% 20Information% 20Booklet.pdf; Deaths and Death Rates by Selected
Causes New York City—2010,
http://www.health.ny.gov/statistics/vital_statistics/2010/table33c.htm). For another use of
statistics in the “primary purpose” inquiry, see United States v. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d
1156, 1163-64, n.5 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding warrants of removal non-testimonial in part
by noting that during a period 281,000 aliens were deported but only 17,000 federal
immigrations were commenced).
65
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9,465 cases and found that 1,121 died from homicide, 709 from suicide,
3,090 from accidents, and 4,256 from natural causes. In other words, some
90% of autopsies involved causes other than homicide.72 In a small
suburban county like Marin County, California, 289 investigations
reported only two homicides.73
Autopsies are associated in the American mind with criminal
investigations—think Law & Order, Bones, NCIS, etc.—and judicial
discussion of autopsies is often in the context of a murder trial. But
autopsies have significant purposes besides punishment.
In 2007 the Centers for Disease Control analyzed autopsies in 47
states and the District of Columbia and found them essential to monitor
infant mortality; to gather statistics about Alzheimer’s, meningitis,
diabetes, or cirrhosis; to track prevalence of death from noxious fumes,
allergies, or gun accidents.74 Autopsies help us effectively direct clinicalresearch funds.75 For instance, they taught us that HIV patients who died
in hospitals could have been given antibiotics that would have extended
their lives.76 They taught us that prostate cancer is best detected by early
screening.77 State laws that obligate autopsies after deaths in prisons,

72

Zabrycki, supra note 26 at 1125.
Marin County Sheriff’s Office, Coroner Division Annual Report, 2011, 6,
available at http://www.marincounty.org/main/board-actions/2013/may/may14/~/media/Files/MarinGov/Board%20Actions/2013/20130514SOCoroner2011.pdf.
74
See, e.g., Donna L. Hoyert, Hsiang-Ching Kung, & Jiaquan Xu, Autopsy Patterns
in 2003, 20(32) VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, March 2007, at 3; see also, FastStats
Homepage, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/homicide.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2013).
75
Hoyert, supra note 74 at 4.
76
See generally Neil A. Martinson et. al, Causes of Death in Hospitalized Adults
With a Premortem Diagnosis of Tuberculosis: An Autopsy Study, 21(15) AIDS 2043
(2007), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17885294.
77
RICHARD A. PRAYSON, DIAGNOSES FROM THE DEAD: THE BOOK OF AUTOPSY 30
(2009).
73
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orphanages, or nursing homes serve to protect the vulnerable.78
Pathologists are the unsung heroes of consumer safety; they revealed that
polyethylene bags suffocate children79 and that cyanide is a fatal
fumigant.80 And before there was Vitamin Water, there was Radithor, the
“radioactive water” that sold wildly until examiners weighed in.81 (“The
Radium Water Worked Fine Until His Jaw Came Off” ran a newspaper
headline.82)
Autopsies established that perhaps as many as 20% of hospital
patients die each year from misdiagnoses83—and help reduce that
percentage by teaching doctors that, say, what they thought was a gastric
ulcer was in fact a stomach infection with sepsis.84 Autopsies identify
dangerous new street drugs—from “wood” alcohol in 1918-1985 to “bath
salts” in 2011.86 Dr. Milton Helpern, the legendary New York City Chief
78

See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22a-242(a) (West 2013) (providing that “[w]hen a
child dies, any law enforcement officer, health care provider or other person having
knowledge of the death shall immediately notify the coroner of the known facts
concerning the time, place, manner and circumstances of the death” (emphasis added)).
79
MILTON HELPERN WITH BERNARD KNIGHT, AUTOPSY: THE MEMOIRS OF THE
MILTON HELPERN, THE WORLD’S GREATEST MEDICAL DETECTIVE 66-71, 175-76 (1977).
80
DEBORAH BLUM, THE POISONER’S HANDBOOK: MURDER AND THE BIRTH OF
FORENSIC MEDICINE IN JAZZ AGE NEW YORK 66-67, 125-26 (2010).
81
BLUM, supra note 80, at 179, 219 (recounting the FDA’s cease-and-desist order
against Radithor’s manufacturer).
82
Ron Winslow, The Radium Water Worked Fine Until His Jaw Came Off, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 1, 1990, at A1.
83
PRAYSON, supra note 77, at 18.
84
Id. at 23-24.
85
BLUM, supra note 80, at 46-49.
86
Jane M. Prosser & Lewis S. Nelson, The Toxicology of Bath Salts: A Review of
Synthetic Cathinones, 8 J. MED. TOXICOLOGY 33, 37 (2011); Jason Jerry, Gregory
Collins, & David Streem, Synthetic Legal Intoxicating Drugs: The Emerging ‘Incense’
and ‘Bath Salt” Phenomenon, 79(4) CLEVELAND CLINIC J. OF MED. 258, 262 (2012)
(relating that autopsy showed “bath salts” were actually form of MDPV, a powerful
stimulant with no FDA-approved medical use). See also SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
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Examiner, proved that, contrary to popular belief, heroin addicts in the
mid-1930s were dying in epidemic proportions not from the opiate itself
but from malaria-infected syringes.87 In the 1950s, his office discovered
that the subtle poison of household carbon monoxide was leaking from
cooking ranges and refrigerators—a design flaw that caused many
wrongful murder prosecutions—and saved hundreds of lives.88 Autopsies
reveal the that fatal cocktails took Heath Ledger89 and Cory Monteith,90
and these overdose reports almost never figure in a trial against a drug
dealer. Nor does a quest for indictment instigate autopsies after deadly
outbreaks of salmonella91 or E. coli.92
SERVICES, DRUG ABUSE WARNING NETWORK: DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW DESIGN
(METHODOLOGY REPORT) 13-15 (2002) (describing the DAWN program of the
Department of Health & Human Services gathers local information to “serve as a first
indicator of the serious consequences of drug use” from sources that include “autopsy
results”).
87
HELPERN, supra note 79, at 66-71; United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1235
n.159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (describing Hearings Before the House Select Committee on
Crime, “Crime in America–Heroin Importation, Distribution, Packaging and
Paraphernalia,” 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 184 (1970) (testimony of Dr. Milton Helpern, June
27, 1970)).
88
HELPERN, supra note 79, at 176-83.
89
James Barren, Medical Examiner Rules Ledger’s Death Accidental, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/nyregion/07ledger.html.
90
Stuart Oldham, Cory Monteith Autopsy Reveals Heroin and Alcohol Caused
Death, VARIETY, July 16, 2013, available at http://variety.com/2013/tv/news/corymonteith-autopsy-reveals-heroin-and-alcohol-caused-death-1200563621.
91
See, e.g., Salmonellosis, 2010, 38(1) MINN. DEPT. OF HEALTH: DISEASE CONTROL
NEWSLETTER 16 (2011) (“Salmonella was isolated at autopsy from the spleen of an 18year-old case with sudden death”), available at
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/idepc/newsletters/dcn/sum10/salmonellosis.html; E.R.
Shipp, Midwest Salmonella Cases Force Dairy to Halt Work, N.Y. TIMES, April 11, 1985
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1985/04/11/us/midwest-salmonella-cases-forcedairy-to-halt-work.html (“[A]utopsy . . . confirmed that salmonella infection had
contributed to the death of a 53-year-old man.”). See also James Randerson, Lack of
Autopsies Hampering Bird Flu Fight, Warns Doctor, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 2, 2006,
available at http://www.theguardian.com/science/2006/jan/03/infectiousdiseases.birdflu.
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The point is that these types of autopsies are self-evidently nontestimonial. We should not testimonialize the work of the same neutral
examiner in the same examining room conducting the same objective
procedure because his subject appears to have been killed by a human
being instead of a bacterium or the poison of a meth lab. The CDC survey
showed that some 7.7% of deaths led to autopsies.93 Usually there was
reason to suspect the naturalness of the death: 0.6% of deaths in nursing
homes and 0.8% of deaths in hospice facilities prompted autopsies; so did
91.8% of apparent homicides.94 The latter figure amounts to 15,388
cases—equal to the number of suicides—95out of a total of 173,745
autopsies that year.96 This means that over 90% of autopsy reports lacked
even the possibility of use in a criminal trial. Creating prosecution
evidence is not the primary purpose of autopsies in America.
A proper autopsy can never itself establish someone’s guilt. 97 An
ancient physician may have found that Julius Caesar suffered 23 bodily
wounds, but only an eyewitness or confession could prove tyrannicide.
From the impartial examiner’s view, the task is always the same: to show
that a human being died from a particular cause.98 There is an impressive
94

KNDO 23, Autopsy Performed on Richland E. coli Victim,
http://www.nbcrightnow.com/global/story.asp?s=6026797; Tim Hay, Autopsy on
Woman, 95, Who May Have Died Due to E. coli, OAKLAND TRIB., Nov. 2, 2003.
93
Hoyert, supra note 74, at 2.
94
Id. at 3.
95
Id. at 13.
96
Id. at 2.
97
See, e.g., Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d at 917 (“[T]he autopsy report at issue does not, in
and of itself, prove the guilt of Kennedy and is not inherently inculpatory.”) This is the
error made by Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause After
Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791, 852 (2007). She writes that an autopsy
report “really does squarely fit into the category of the testimonial. This cannot and
should not be doubted. It is created as part of an ongoing investigation in order to
produce evidence. It is prepared with an eye toward future criminal prosecution.” Not so.
98
RICHARD A. PRAYSON, DIAGNOSES FROM THE DEAD: THE BOOK OF AUTOPSY 59
(2009); see, e.g., People v. Washington, 654 N.E.2d 967, 969 (N.Y. 1995) (agreeing that
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Sherlockian specificity here: an examiner might be able to show
strangulation from harm to “neck organs consistent with fingertips,”
“pinpoint hemorrhages in her eyes” indicating lack of oxygen, and selfinflicted tongue biting.99 Another pathologist might state that the “amount
of pressure required to stop the flow of blood from the brain is ‘about 4.4
pounds’”100 and that death resulted when this force was kept up for “three
to six minutes.”101 These discoveries disclose a great deal—but never the
perpetrator’s identity. The report, moreover, can be used by both sides.102
Indeed, pathologists’ work also often terminates a prosecution by, say,
establishing a time of death that matches a suspect’s alibi103 or by allowing
the defense to show that the cause of death was a “ruptured congenital
brain aneurysm” and that a fistfight “was not a contributing cause.”104
Each autopsy report must be considered individually, but most
autopsies fall short of testimoniality as defined by the Supreme Court.
Consider Bullcoming (“A document created solely for an ‘evidentiary

the New York City’s Office of the Medical Examiner’s “mandate . . . is clear, to provide
an impartial determination of the cause of death.”).
99
Dungo, 286 P.3d at 446.
100
Leach, 980 N.E.2d at 576.
101
Id. at 595.
102
Dungo, 286 P.3d at 453 (citation omitted). (“[A]n autopsy physician documents
his or her observations of the decedent’s injuries partly to provide evidence for court, but
detailed documentation of the pathologist’s observations is also important to support or
refute interpretations and to serve as a record”).
103
See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2244 (“When lab technicians are asked to work on the
production of a DNA profile, they often have no idea what the consequences of their
work will be. In some cases, a DNA profile may provide powerful incriminating evidence
against a person who is identified either before or after the profile is completed. But in
others, the primary effect of the profile is to exonerate a suspect who has been charged or
is under investigation.”).
104
Leach, 980 N.E.2d at 591 (emphasis added); see also id. (“[E]ven when the police
suspect foul play and the medical examiner’s office is aware of this suspicion, an autopsy
might reveal that the deceased died of natural causes and, thus, exonerate a suspect.”).
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purpose’ . . . made in aid of a police investigation”105); Bryant (“a
statement . . . procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court
substitute for trial testimony”106)]; Melendez–Diaz (“the sole purpose of
the affidavits was to provide prima facie evidence of the composition,
quality, and the net weight of the analyzed substance”)107; and Davis
(statements under formal police interrogation are an “obvious substitute
for live testimony”).108 Surely if a man bleeding to death in a parking lot
can identify his shooter to police without “testifying”—the facts of
Bryant—a pathologist can likewise relate conclusions about cause of death
(not identity of suspect) without an intent to accuse. The pathologist,
moreover, can deliver his statement without the medium of any police
officer.109
The drug certificates in Melendez-Diaz and blood-alcohol analyses
in Bullcoming were testimonial because the labs tested the powder or
blood for one reason only: enforcing criminal laws on drugs and drunk
driving.110 Other people may have wanted the evidence for civil suits

105

Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717.
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155.
107
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 (citation omitted).
108
Davis, 547 U.S. at 830.
109
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1173. The statement derived exclusively from the officers’
recollection at trial of what the victim said.
110
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 (“[U]nder Massachusetts law the sole purpose of
the affidavits was to provide ‘prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the
net weight’ of the analyzed substance”); Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2720 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); State v. Aragon, 225 P.3d 1280, 1287 (2010) (“The chemical forensic
reports at issue in this case are inadmissible absent confrontation, because although it is
the ‘business’ of the Southern Crime Laboratory, a public agency, to analyze substances
for narcotic content, the laboratory’s purpose for preparing chemical forensic reports is
for their use in court, not as a function of the laboratory’s administrative activities.” See
also City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 91 P.3d 591, 593-96 (Nev. 2004) (finding a nurse’s
affidavit about conditions of blood-drawing from drunk-driving suspect was testimonial
since prepared solely for prosecution.). Cf. United States v. DeLeon, 678 F.3d 317, 325
(4th Cir. 2012) (“[O]urs is also not a case in which the social worker operated as an agent
106
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(those injured by Donald Bullcoming’s car, the K-Mart that employed Mr.
Melendez-Diaz, etc.), but prosecution is the state’s reason, and the drug
and alcohol tests were specifically done at police request. In Bullcoming,
the state didn’t even try to suggest another purpose, like medical
treatment.111 So, too, in the case with forensic disciplines like
fingerprinting, ballistics, and arson analysis—designed, one and all, to
prove criminality. But as shown, autopsies are mostly not conducted with
the primary motivation of generating evidence for a criminal trial.
C. AUTOPSIES ARE GENERALLY NEUTRALLY PERFORMED
Forensic evidence sways juries because it is neutral-seeming and
scientific. This is why flawed or misleadingly used forensic evidence often
lies behind a false conviction. Judges know this. The Wall Street Journal
reported last year that recent court decisions and law-enforcement policies
increasingly cast doubt on evidentiary “staples” like “hair samples, burn
patterns, bite marks, ballistics evidence and handwriting analysis.”112 So
are autopsies any better?
Yes—and the chief difference is that the pathologist who performs
an autopsy is not an arm of law enforcement but a doctor under a civilstatutory duty to investigate mysterious deaths. 113 Most examiners are

of law enforcement. . . . [She] did not act at the behest of law enforcement, as there was
no active criminal investigation when she and Jordan spoke.”).
111
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring.).
112
Jack Nicas, Flawed Evidence Under a Microscope, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2013, at
A3. See, e.g., United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 573-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(Rakoff, J.) (stating that “ballistics examination not only lacks the rigor of science but
suffers from greater uncertainty than many other kinds of forensic evidence” and
contrasting it with the reliability of a “physician’s diagnosis.”).
113
See, e.g., Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 (“If 911 operators are not themselves law
enforcement officers, they may at least be agents of law enforcement when they conduct
interrogations of 911 callers.”).
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actually private M.D.s under contract.114 Yet Crawford’s concern was the
“involvement of government officers in the production of testimonial
evidence.”115 When Justice Scalia blasted the notion of “neutral”
government officials, he was taking aim at Washington State’s claim
about neutral police officers.116 Being on the government payroll—like a
National Weather Service forecaster or Amtrak conductor—does not make
you adversarial to criminals. Crawford had in mind officials with an
“investigative and prosecutorial function.”117 But a pathologist’s natural
colleagues are not crime-lab technicians but dentists, radiologists,
neurologists, and anatomists.118 Even routine field-written statements of
Border Patrol agents can be non-testimonial, regardless of whether they
later are offered at a smuggling trial.119

114

See Coroner Table Generator, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, available at
http://www.npr.org/buckets/news/2011/01/coroner-stats/county-table.php?year=2010);
See also COMMITTEE ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCE
COMMUNITY, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 248 (2009)
[hereinafter “NAS Report”] (“[M]edical examiners are almost always physicians, are
appointed, and are often pathologists or forensic pathologists.”).
115
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 53.
116
Id. at 66 (“The Framers would be astounded to learn that ex parte testimony could
be admitted against a criminal defendant because it was elicited by ‘neutral’ government
officers.”).
117
Id. at 53 (“That interrogators are police officers rather than magistrates does not
change the picture either. Justices of the peace conducting examinations under the Marian
statutes were not magistrates as we understand that office today, but had an essentially
investigative and prosecutorial function.”).
118
HELPERN, supra note 79, at 28.
119
United States v. Morales, 2013 WL 3306395, No. 12-10069, *4 (9th Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted) (“[A] Border Patrol agent uses the form in the field to document basic
information, to notify the aliens of their administrative rights, and to give the aliens a
chance to request their preferred disposition. The Field 826s are completed whether or
not the government decides to prosecute the aliens or anyone else criminally. The nature
and use of the Field 826 makes clear that its primary purpose is administrative, not for
use as evidence at a future criminal trial.”).
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Unlike Crawford’s interrogators,120 pathologists do not ask leading
questions or interpret vague answers. They have no stake in the
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. They are not praised for
successful prosecutions or blamed for acquittals. They do not carry guns
or badges or deceive or cajole. They investigate causes of death, not
crimes. They conclude on the conditions of a body, not on who bears guilt
for it.121 The National Association of Medical Examiners states that the
“[p]erformance of a forensic autopsy is the practice of medicine.”122 If we
are told in Giles v. California (2008) that reports of “abuse and
intimidation” during medical treatment never require confrontation,123
what is the difference here, except less risk of falsity?124 A routine autopsy
report—cool, impartial, precise—is akin to a careful hospital record.125
Certainly the typical testimonial infirmities are absent. No issues of
perception—foggy? dark? no glasses?—exist. Concerns about
120

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53.
See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2251 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The declarant [in
Crawford, Davis, and Bryant] was essentially an adverse witness making an accusatory,
testimonial statement—implicating the core concerns of the Lord Cobham-type
affidavits. But here the DNA report sought, not to accuse petitioner, but instead to
generate objectively a profile of a then-unknown suspect’s DNA from the semen he left
in committing the crime.”).
122
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, FORENSIC AUTOPSY
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 4 (2006), available at
www.mtf.org pdf name standards 2006.pdf; see also NAS REPORT, supra note 114, at
252 (“The medical examiner is first and foremost a physician, whose education, training,
and experience is in the application of the body of medicine”).
123
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008). See also United States v. DeLeon,
678 F.3d 317, 327 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that statements by child victim of abuse,
before his murder, to treatment manager of Air Force medical program were admissible
under Rule 803(4) and non-testimonial).
124
Cf. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1161 n.12 (“[T]he severe injuries of the victim would
undoubtedly also weigh on the credibility and reliability that the trier of fact would afford
to the statements.”).
125
Cf. Dixon v. Superior Court, 170 Cal.App.4th 1271, 1278 (2009) (holding that an
autopsy report is a public record under California law).
121
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deteriorating memory vanish because examiners dictate or take notes
while they (as they put it) “cut their case.”126 (The real memory problem
can arise when prosecutors call examiners who perform dozens or
hundreds of autopsies a year, months or years after the procedure.) Verbal
ambiguity is rarely a problem when speaking of “drowning due to the
effects of atherosclerotic heart disease and cocaine use” (Whitney
Houston)127 or a “[b]ullet wound of entrance at the level of the 6th cervical
vertebra 5 cm. to the right of the midline” (John Dillinger).128 Is there a
risk of fabrication?129 Professor Paul Giannelli wrote a paper on crime-lab
error and fraud and offered precisely one example of a pathologist’s
falsification.130 If Bryant could say that people in mortal distress are

126

PRAYSON, supra note 77, at 45, 56-57; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 345 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (“A typical witness must recall a previous event that he or she perceived
just once, and thus may have misperceived or misremembered. But an analyst making a
contemporaneous observation need not rely on memory; he or she instead reports the
observations at the time they are made.”).
127
See Kristy McCracken, Whitney Houston Autopsy Report 9, AUTOPOSYFILES.ORG
(Feb. 12, 2012), available at,
http://www.autopsyfiles.org/reports/Celebs/houston,%20whitney_report.pdf.
128
See Frank J. Walsh, John Dillinger Autopsy Report 3, AUTOPSYFILES.ORG (July
23, 1934), available at
http://www.autopsyfiles.org/reports/Other/dillinger,%20john_report.pdf.
129
See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157 (finding that certain types of hearsay are nontestimonial because, produced for purposes other use at trial, they pose a significantly
reduced “prospect of fabrication”).
130
Paul C. Giannelli, in The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The
Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439, 449–53 (1997),
tells the sordid story of pathologist Ralph Erdmann, convicted for falsified reports in the
1980s. His lies were just bizarre: at times they favored the prosecution (he said a child
died from a blow but in fact it was drowning); at others the defense (he identified
pneumonia as the cause when it was actually a gunshot to the head). Couldn’t the absence
of fraud cases be the more remarkable fact? In James, 712 F.3d at 103–04 the defendant
made an apparently implausible claim that the examiner was bribed to change a cause of
death for a cut of the insurance money. In People v. Beeler, 891 P.2d 153, 168 (Cal.
1995), a pathologist testified that another pathologist named Dr. Bolduc “had caused
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unlikely to “fabricat[e],”131 we might observe that board-certified
pathologists, too, have other things on their mind—namely, accuracy—
and no inherent motive to lie.132 As Lieutenant Bowers of the Alameda
County Coroner’s Bureau told us, a pathologist’s livelihood is premised
on “credibility,” and a “tainted” doctor will struggle to find a job in county
offices or lucrative defense work.133
The best claim for cross-examination is to test competence.
Pathologists may train for years but they are still humans exercising
judgment.134 Mistakes can be made and conclusions at times are
subjective. Yet unlike a good deal of evidence at criminal trials, autopsy
reports are carefully substantiated, allowing review by others inside an
examiner’s office or opposing experts.135 A pathologist’s tools are not
interrogations but scalpels and microscopes. We draw no distinction
between factual observation and judgment—which was ruled out in

‘quite a bit of consternation’ in a prior murder case by basing his conclusion regarding
the cause of death on a police report rather than on medical evidence.”
131
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1161 (“[T]he victim’s injuries could be so debilitating as to
prevent her from thinking sufficiently clearly to understand whether her statements are
for the purpose of addressing an ongoing emergency or for the purpose of future
prosecution.”).
132
See, e.g., Lackey, 120 P.3d at 351 (noting that circumstances of autopsy are such
that “medical examiner would have little incentive to fabricate the results”).
133
Interview with Lieutenant R. Bowers, Coroner’s Bureau Unit Commander, in
Alameda County, Cal., (Aug. 7, 2013) (notes on file with author).
134
See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 321 (“Contrary to respondent’s and the dissent’s
suggestion, there is little reason to believe that confrontation will be useless in testing
analysts’ honesty, proficiency, and methodology—the features that are commonly the
focus in the cross-examination of experts.”); id. at 320 (observing that drug-testing
“requires the exercise of judgment and presents a risk of error that might be explored on
cross-examination”); United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 1232 (11th Cir. 2012)
(“[T]he observational data and conclusions contained in the autopsy reports are the
product of the skill, methodology, and judgment of the highly trained examiners who
actually performed the autopsy.”).
135
See, e.g., Dungo, 286 P.3d at 452.
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Bullcoming136—but merely point out that even when discretion is required
the work of an examiner is still almost entirely a matter of clinical
recordation. Even Justice Scalia noted that although “reliability” alone
does not determine non-testimoniality, it can certainly “supplement” such
a finding.137
Pathologists do not become part of the prosecution as even a
neutral witness does. A bystander to a crime may only want to relate what
she saw, but by the time she is questioned by detectives and handed to the
D.A. to be prepared for the stand, the risk of tilted testimony or one-sideonly elicitations is obvious. Not with pathologists. Autopsy reports do not
pose the dangers caused by custodial interrogation. Police and
prosecutors—when kept appropriately separate from the doctor, as
discussed below—cannot sway the report’s substance, or create a
favorable record through suggestive questioning, or see to the omission of
defendant-friendly evidence. They simply have no say. There is no risk
that pathologist, preparing to make his “Y” incision in the body, will tell
only one side of the story, because there is only one side: cause of death.
“We are not interested in whodunit,” said Dr. Helpern. “All we want to
know is what did it.”138
D. PATHOLOGISTS TODAY ARE NOT THE CORONERS OF THE
COMMON LAW
A footnote in Crawford claimed that “several early American
authorities flatly rejected any special status for coroner statements.”139 It
136

Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714–15; Navarette, 294 P.3d at 438. This in turn rules
out the approach in cases like Rollins, 866 A.2d at 954 and Lackey, 120 P.3d at 351–52.
137
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1176 (Scalia, J., concurring). The majority agreed. Id. at
1155 (“In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, designed
to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.”).
138
HELPERN, supra note 79.
139
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47 n.2; see also Giles, 554 U.S. at 399–400 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“Coroner’s statements seem to have had special status [in English
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cited two antebellum decisions and the treatise of the great Michigan
Justice Thomas Cooley.140 The footnote has misled judges and
commentators and in any event is wrong.141 What Cooley actually wrote
was closer to the reverse: he said there are “exceptions” to the rule that
witnesses can be confronted in criminal cases, one being where a “witness
was sworn . . . before a coroner.”142 The example reminds us that
pathologists, unlike coroners, do not “swear” anyone or take evidence
from any place other than their examining table. In the cases cited by
Justice Scalia (respectively, from 1844 and 1858) the “coroner statements”
were statements to a coroner, during a deposition, which the coroner
submitted directly to the court.143 This is classic ex parte stuff—in a word,
an inquest (which has the same root as “inquisition”).144 It is the opposite
of the practice of the modern clinical pathologist, who with at least eight

precedents] that may sometimes have permitted the admission of prior unconfronted
testimonial statements despite lack of cross-examination. But, if so, that special status
failed to survive the Atlantic voyage.”).
140
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47 n.2.
141
James, 712 F.3d at 108 n.2 (Eaton, J., concurring); Mnookin, supra note 97, at
852 (“Crawford itself raises and then appears to reject the possibility of a special
exception for coroner statements . . . .”).
142
THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 318 (1868).
143
State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. 124, 124–25 (1844) (“The question is this. Is it
indispensable, by the rules of legal evidence, that the defendant, Daniel Campbell, must
have been present; or, at least, had an opportunity of hearing and examining R. Kelly,
when his depositions were taken, upon the inquest holden over the body of the deceased,
A. Defee, in order to render such depositions competent evidence against Daniel
Campbell, upon his trial before the jury for the murder of Defee; when the witness died,
after such depositions had been taken?”); State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 440 (1858)
(discussing coroner statements in England).
144
Campbell, 30 S.C.L at 126–132; Houser, 26 Mo. at 436 (“[S]uch testimony has
never been permitted in this country, and in England its admissibility has been altogether
placed upon the peculiar dignity and importance attached to the office of coroner; and no
such reasons exist here.”).
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years of medical training145 starts with the premise that “‘I’m going to use
my eyes, and I'm going to use my hands to figure out what caused the
death.’”146 This is true to the etymology of “autopsy,” a mid-17th-century
derivation of the Greek autopsia (“seeing with one’s own eyes”), which
first appears in Westlaw’s annals only in 1843.147
Crawford said, quite rightly, that applying a constitutional clause
to a “phenomenon that did not exist at the time of its adoption . . . involves
some degree of estimation.”148 Doesn’t that require us to look into what a
coroner did when John Marshall strode the earth? James Wilson, the
wisest framer when it came to questions of criminal procedure, described
coroners as elected laymen, complementary to sheriffs, whose duty it was
to summon juries and accumulate evidence.149 No founding-era coroner,
wrote Dr. Helpern, actually “knew anything about the medical aspects of a
case,” and when they bothered at all, their medical judgments were
nothing more than crude layman’s guesses.150 Fast-forward to the
Louisiana Supreme Court describing the coroner’s duties at common law,
circa 1852: to “hold an inquest on the body;” to “require, at the public
expense, the services of physicians, to give their opinion on the subject”;
to “institute a public prosecution against the supposed perpetrator of the

145

See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 114, at 256 (“Forensic pathologists are
physicians who have completed, at a minimum, four years of medical school and three to
four years of medical specialty training in anatomical pathology or anatomical and
clinical pathology, followed by an accredited fellowship year in forensic pathology.”).
146
Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1232 n.19.
147
Fox v. Walsh, 5 Rob. (LA) 222, 223 (1843). By contrast, “coroner” first appears
in Westlaw in a case from 1723. Robins’s Lessee v. Bush, 1 H. & McH. 50, 53 (Md.
Prov. 1723).
148
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36.
149
KERMIT L. HALL AND MARK DAVID HALL, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON VOL. 2 at 1017-18 (2007).
150
HELPERN, supra note 79 (discussing the colonial and early American practice of
coroners).
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deed”; and to “cause [the guilty] to be arrested.”151 This is all a far cry
from the work of the medical examiner today.
In 1840 Charles Dickens was part of a coroner’s inquest into an
infant’s death. A beadle assembled twelve men, brought them to a morgue,
and, with the coroner (a surgeon and ex-Member of Parliament), exhibited
the body.152 Could the difference from modern-day practice be greater? A
jury able to converse with a member of the prosecutorial apparatus and no
defense presence to speak of? Jurors personally confronting (and recoiling
at) ghastly evidence? What did the coroner or beadle say to these jurorwitnesses, anyway? An English treatise from 1883 (the year the Brooklyn
Bridge opened), cited by Justice Thomas in Williams, states that coroners
were “charged with investigating suspicious deaths by asking local
citizens if they knew ‘who [was] culpable either of the act or of the
force.’”153 Even in 1925 New York coroners still gathered evidence from
witnesses and displayed bodies. In The Great Gatsby, Fitzgerald describes
a coroner brought in by police; he shows George Wilson’s corpse to
Myrtle’s sister and takes her sworn statement that Myrtle did not know Jay
Gatsby—not exactly medical testimony.154 Around this time New York
City began to replace coroners with full-time pathologists—after the
scandalizing 1915 Wallstein Report revealed that coroners, most of them
bribe-hungry political hacks, were guilty of all the ineptitude one might
expect of plumbers and saloonkeepers—literally—given the task of
sophisticated medical evaluation.155

151

State v. Parker, 7 La. Ann. 83, 84 (1852).
CLAIRE TOMALIN, CHARLES DICKENS: A LIFE, xxxix-xl Penguin 2011.
153
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2262 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 1 J. STEPHEN, A
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 217–218 (Routledge/Thoemmes Press
1883) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
154
F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 163-64 (Scribner 1925).
155
HELPERN, supra note 79 (describing the professionalization of autopsy work in
the 20th century); Blum, supra note 80, at 19-21.
152
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The triumph of science made the advancement possible.156 In the
early 1800s, we still tested for poison by feeding animals a victim’s last
meal.157 Coroners still exist today, but they are largely elected officials
who never undertake actual medical work. The word “coroner,” some
three centuries older than the word “autopsy,” comes from the AngloFrench corouner, or keeper of the Crown’s pleas.158 In olde England, only
the king examined corpses, just as he was the only man with knights
enough to enforce the law. (Hence the two meanings of “court.”) A
common-law coroner was an inquisitor.159 It was a different office in a
different age.
E. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Our argument seeks only to apply Supreme Court precedent to
autopsy reports. But many important policy considerations nonetheless
loom, revolving around the notion (as one court wrote) that it is “against
156

For a short history of the development, see NAS Report, supra note 114, at 24142 (“In 1877, Massachusetts became the first state to replace its coroners with medical
examiners, who were required to be physicians.”).
157
Blum, supra note 80, at 1.
158
See, e,g., “coroner,” Dictionary.com, at
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/coroner?s=t (last accessed January 11, 2014).
Some states distinguish between “coroner reports” and “autopsy reports,” see Lackey,
120 P.3d at 203, or between “coroners” and “medical examiners,” see Dungo, 286 P.3d at
453 (“A California county may choose to employ an appointed medical examiner in place
of a coroner. In such a county, the medical examiner exercises the statutory powers and
duties of the coroner.”). Other states eschew these dichotomies. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §
24-11-4 (West 1978) (“As used in the New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1978
Compilation, ‘coroner’ means the district medical investigator.”).
159
Campbell, 30 S.C.L. at 134 (“If the witnesses examined on a coroner’s inquest be
dead or beyond sea, their depositions may be read; for the coroner is an officer appointed,
on the behalf of the public, to make inquiry about the matter within his jurisdiction.”); see
also NAS Report, supra note 114, at 241 (“The [coroner’s] office originally was created
to provide a local official whose primary duty was to protect the financial interest of the
crown in criminal proceedings.”).
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society's interests to permit the unavailability of the medical examiner
who prepared the report to preclude the prosecution of a homicide
case,”160 especially with such reliable, non-accusatory evidence. The
Williams plurality added another: a rule that operated to exclude neutral
lab evidence would “encourage prosecutors to forgo DNA testing and rely
instead on older forms of evidence, such as eyewitness identification, that
are less reliable.”161
Years can pass between an autopsy and a prosecution. The
examiner might be unavailable by the time of trial. In one Illinois case,
four gang members killed three teenagers in 1979: two were convicted
soon thereafter; one was arrested in California in 1988 and pleaded guilty;
the last was only convicted in 1992.162 A right, too rigid, can harden into
wrong, as the poet said, and we should look doubtfully on a misinterpreted
right of confrontation that allows murderers to escape justice by avoiding
arrest or delaying trial long enough.163 This would effectively impose a
“statute of limitations” on one of the few crimes that knows no time
limit.164
Autopsy reports, unlike drug substance tests, cannot be
replicated.165 Disinterment or cold storage is sometimes an option but

160

Dungo, 286 P.3d at 457 (quoting Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d at 869).
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228 (Alito, J.); id. at 2251 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]o
bar admission of the out-of-court records at issue here could undermine, not fortify, the
accuracy of factfinding at a criminal trial. . . . An interpretation of the Clause that risks
greater prosecution reliance upon less reliable evidence cannot be sound.”).
162
Leach, 980 N.E.2d at 592 (citing People v. Caballero, 794 N.E.2d 251 (Ill. 2002)).
In Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1164, the shooter was arrested a year after the killing. In Lackey,
120 P.3d at 196, Lackey committed the crime in 1982 and fled to Canada and was only
caught in Alabama in 2002.
163
ALEXANDER POPE, ESSAY ON MAN, THIRD EPISTLE 193-94 (Mark Pattison ed., 6th
ed. 1878).
164
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2251 (Breyer, J., concurring).
165
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 318 n.5 (“Some forensic analyses, such as autopsies
and breathalyzer tests, cannot be repeated.”); Dungo, 286 P.3d at 457 (quoting Durio, 794
161
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another complete autopsy never is. It is true that evidence can also be lost
forever with, say, an eyewitness who never testifies and then dies. The
difference is that with most witnesses testimonial infirmities are usually
important, whereas with autopsies, they almost never are. This is a policy
argument, but the Supreme Court has not been above indulging in them
itself. Melendez-Diaz, for one, said that the “prospect of confrontation”
would “deter fraudulent analysis,”166 but fraud is a problem quite separate
from testimoniality.
A wealthy county like Marin in the San Francisco Bay Area may
have two homicides a year, but across the water in Alameda County—
home to Oakland—examiners might perform one or two homicide
autopsies a day. Dr. Thomas Beaver, that county’s chief pathologist,
estimates that he is under subpoena to appear in court every single day.167
He told us that a rule finding autopsy reports to be testimonial would force
examiners’ offices like his to choose between time on their work and
letting prosecutions fail.168
Finally, the rule of the Williams dissenters—a statement is
testimonial if made primarily to prove events “potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution”169—is simply too diffuse.170 What wouldn’t be
N.Y.S.2d at 869) (“Unlike other forensic tests, an autopsy cannot be replicated by another
pathologist.”).
166
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318-19.
167
Author interview with Dr. Thomas Beaver, Chief Forensic Pathologist, Alameda
County, California, August 6, 2013 (notes on file with author).
168
Id. The Melendez-Diaz majority made clear that even relatively insignificant
evidence, if testimonial, cannot avoid confrontation. Id., 557 U.S. at 314. “For the sake of
these negligible benefits,” replied the dissent, “the Court threatens to disrupt forensic
investigations across the country.” Id. at 340-41 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The majority’s
position seems short-sighted: the evidence’s significance at trial should matter, just like it
did for the framers concerned about the sure damnation of secret accusations.
169
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2273 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas’s statement
of this part of the rule is similar, but he adds the formality requirement. Id. at 2261
(“[T]he declarant must primarily intend to establish some fact with the understanding that
his statement may be used in a criminal prosecution.”).
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“potentially” relevant? (This article, we hope, is potentially relevant to
prosecutions.) Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming affirmed that business
records are ordinarily admissible without confrontation, even though
potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution.171 For Fortune 500
companies, most business records are potentially relevant to criminal
charges; multinational corporations keep due-diligence inquiries for FCPA
subpoenas, compliance-mad hedge funds catalog emails to fend off
insider-trading charges, etc. Or a pharmacist may know that her legally
mandated logs of pseudoephedrine purchases will be used against meth
dealers; the logs are still non-testimonial business records.172 The
dissenters’ test really turns on the “primary purpose” and not the
“potentially relevant” part. The inquiry is into the totality of circumstances
under which the record was prepared.173

170

United States v. Morales, 2013 WL 3306395, at *4 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotations
omitted) (stating that a Border Patrol’s field-written statement is not “‘testimonial’ due to
the ‘mere possibility’ that it could be used in a later criminal prosecution”); United States
v. Mendez, 514 F.3d 1035, 1046 (10th Cir. 2008) (“That a piece of evidence [a drug
ledger] may become ‘relevant to later criminal prosecution’ does not automatically place
it within the ambit of ‘testimonial,’ otherwise ‘any piece of evidence which aids the
prosecution would be testimonial’”).
171
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324; Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2720. Some state
courts relied on the business and public records hearsay exception in allowing the
admission of autopsy reports or their use by experts. These exceptions are contiguous
with the primary purpose test: if a report is created primarily for use in a prosecution it is
inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) or 803(8) or state analogues.
172
United States v. Towns, 718 F.3d 404, 410-11 (5th Cir. 2013).
173
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162 (“In determining whether a declarant’s statements are
testimonial, courts should look to all of the relevant circumstances.”); Williams, 132 S.
Ct. at 2243 (Alito, J.); Dungo, 283 P.3d at 458 (Chin, J., concurring).
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III. WHEN AN AUTOPSY REPORT IS NON-TESTIMONIAL
A. FORMAL SEPARATION
Before Melendez-Diaz, courts regularly held that autopsy reports
were admissible as non-testimonial business or public records.174 Since
that decision the most important factor for judges undertaking the primarypurpose inquiry with autopsy reports has been the degree of police
involvement in the report’s creation.175 For that reason the best way to
avoid a confrontation problem is to ensure that an examiner’s work is
maximally independent of police and prosecutorial influence. We looked
at federal circuit and state supreme courts that ruled on this issue since
Melendez-Diaz. Most of them declined, properly in our view, to set out a
categorical rule about whether autopsies are testimonial.176
174

State v. Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621, 638 (Ohio 2006) (holding that autopsy reports are
admissible non-testimonial public or business records); United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d
227, 236-37 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that autopsy reports are admissible as business
records and are non-testimonial “even where the declarant is aware that [the report] may
be available for later use at trial”); People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2005) (exempting autopsy report from Crawford under business-record exception);
Rollins v. State, 866 A.2d 926, 954 (Md. App. 2005) (holding that autopsy reports are
non-testimonial under business records exception provided findings reported are “routine,
descriptive and not analytical” and do not report “contested conclusions”); State v. Cutro,
618 S.E.2d 890 (S.C. 2005) (holding that autopsy reports are non-testimonial public
records).
175
See Dungo, 286 P.3d 442 at 454 (“[T]he court’s Crawford jurisprudence suggests
that testimonial character depends, to some extent, on the degree to which the statement
was produced by or at the behest of government agents for use in a criminal
prosecution”). This specific factor has also been determinative in post-Melendez-Diaz
confrontation cases outside the autopsy context. In Conners v. State, 92 So.3d 676, 684
(Miss. 2012), the defendant claimed he couldn’t have shot two people in his trailer since
he was unconscious under heavy drugs. At trial the state disproved it in part with bloodtoxicology tests, but the court found that the tests were “performed at the request of the
Pike County Sheriff’s Department with the results to be used in the prosecution.” Id. at
684.
176
See, e.g., James, 712 F.3d at 88 (“[E]ven if these cases cast doubt on any
categorical designation of certain forensic reports as admissible in all cases, the autopsy
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In United States v. Moore, drug conspirators got life for a spate of
crimes including murder.177 The then-Chief D.C. Medical Examiner
testified about autopsy reports placed into evidence.178 The D.C. Circuit
saw testimonial reports, “document[s] created solely for an evidentiary
purpose made in aid of a police investigation.”179 For instance, observed
the court:
 The Office of the Medical Examiner was “required” by the
D.C. Code to investigate deaths when requested by the
Metropolitan Police Department or U.S. Attorney’s Office.180
 “Law enforcement officers . . . not only observed the autopsies,
a fact that would have signaled to the medical examiner that
the autopsy might bear on a criminal investigation, they
participated in the creation of reports,” i.e., they were “present”
at several examinations and they supplemented one report with
a “crime diagram” and wrote in another: “Should have
indictment re: John Raynor for this murder.”181
In United States v. Ignasiak, a doctor was convicted for
overprescribing deadly pain medications.182 Prosecutors introduced seven
autopsy reports, two of which their expert Dr. Minyard had performed
reports in this case are nevertheless not testimonial”); Moore, 651 F.3d at 72 n.16
(concluding it was “unnecessary to decide as a categorical matter whether autopsy reports
are testimonial, and, in any event, it is doubtful that such an approach would comport
with Supreme Court precedent”); Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1232-33 (leaving open possibility
that if evidence had a non-testimonial ‘primary’ purpose it could avoid confrontation
problem); but see Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d at 917 (determining that because examiner was
obligated to contribute to judicial proceedings under West Virginia statute, “autopsy
reports are under all circumstances testimonial”); Navarette, 294 P.3d at 441 (finding that
“autopsy reports regarding individuals who suffered a violent death are testimonial.”).
177
United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
178
Id. at 72 n.15.
179
Id. at 72 (citations, quotations, and ellipsis omitted).
180
Id. at 73.
181
Id.
182
Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1219.
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herself, as business records (not through her capacity as an expert). 183 The
Eleventh Circuit found the reports testimonial. They were prepared “for
use at trial” under a “statutory framework” in which “medical examiners
worked closely with law enforcement”:184
 “Under Florida law, the Medical Examiners Commission was
created and exists within the Department of Law Enforcement.
Fla. Stat. § 406.02.”185
 The Commission “must include one member who is a state
attorney, one member who is a public defender, one member
who is sheriff, and one member who is the attorney general or
his designee, in addition to five other non-criminal justice
members.”186
 The examiner “relied upon information collected by ‘deputies
on the scene.’”187
In United States v. James, conviction in a creepy conspiracy to
murder for insurance cash turned on toxicology reports and autopsies that
showed whether the deaths were accidental or caused by malicious
poisoning.188 The Second Circuit found the reports non-testimonial: the
“circumstances under which the analysis was prepared” didn’t “establish
that the primary purpose of a reasonable analyst in the declarant’s position
would have been to create a record for use at a later criminal trial.” 189 The

183

Id. at 1229 n.14.
Id. at 1232.
185
Id. at 1231-32.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 1232 n.17.
188
James, 712 F.3d at 85.
189
Id. at 94, 96,102. The court did not believe it was entitled to rely on the Williams
plurality’s statement of the test since five Justices disagreed with it and it seemed to
“conflict directly with Melendez–Diaz.” Id. at 95.
184
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“key,” said the court, was the “particular relationship between [the
medical examiner’s office] and law enforcement”:190
 “[N]either the government nor defense counsel elicited any
information suggesting that law enforcement was ever notified
that Somaipersaud’s death was suspicious, or that any medical
examiner expected a criminal investigation to result from it.”191
 “There is no indication in Brijmohan’s testimony or elsewhere
in the record that a criminal investigation was contemplated
during the inquiry into the cause of Sewnanan’s death,”
especially since the facts at the time suggested “accidental
ingestion or suicide.”14
In State v. Kennedy,192 an autopsy report showed that the victim’s
head had been bashed in. Prosecutors actually conceded that the report
was testimonial,193 but the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
nonetheless proceeded to apply the “primary purpose” test to find
testimoniality:194
 “[M]ost compellingly, the autopsy and required report’s use in
judicial proceedings is one of its statutorily defined
190

James, 712 F.3d at 97. But Judge Eaton, concurring, noted that OCME had a
“long history of cooperation with law enforcement” and “all autopsy reports would
remain statements made directly to law enforcement insofar as they are statutorily
required to be available to law enforcement officers and prosecutors.” Id. at 110, citing
N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 17–205 (1998).
191
James, 712 F.3d at 99. It distinguished Ignasiak on this ground: “the Florida
Medical Examiner’s Office was created and exists within the Department of Law
Enforcement,” where the “OCME is a wholly independent office.” James, 712 F.3d at 99
(citations omitted). See also United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 237 (2d Cir. 2006), a
pre-Melendez-Diaz case, citing People v. Washington, 654 N.E.2d 967, 969 (N.Y. 1995),
which noted that N.Y.C.’s medical examiners “are, by law, independent of and not
subject to the control of the office of the prosecutor, and that OCME is not a law
enforcement agency.”
192
State v. Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905 (W.Va. 2012).
193
Id. at 905, 912.
194
Id. at 916.
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purposes.”195 The examiner is obligated to assist in the
“formulation of conclusions, opinions or testimony in judicial
proceedings.”196
 “Kennedy was under suspicion and in fact, in custody, when
the autopsy was conducted and therefore the autopsy report
could arguably be said to have been prepared to ‘accuse a
targeted individual.’”197 In a subsequent footnote “arguably”
became “necessarily”: “Kennedy was arrested the day Viars’
body was discovered; therefore, the autopsy report necessarily
became part of the case being assembled against him.”198
 “Dr. Sabet testified that law enforcement officers [were]
present during the autopsy, providing a ‘detailed history’ and
engaging in a dialogue with the medical examiner about cause
of death,” which “suggests a collaborative investigative effort
in making the case against a suspect.”199
In People v. Leach, a husband strangled his wife to death. 200 Could
the pressure on her neck have been an accident in a heated argument?201
The Illinois Supreme Court found the autopsy report non-testimonial: it
was neither “prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted
individual” nor “for the primary purpose of providing evidence in a
criminal case.”202

195

Id.
Id. at 917, citing W. Va. Code § 61–12–3(d).
197
Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d at 917.
198
Id., at 917 n.10.
199
Id.
200
People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570, 572 (Ill. 2012).
201
Id. at 595 (highlighting defendant’s suggestion that “some undiagnosed heart or
other ailment” may have caused victim to die “more quickly than a healthy individual
would have died from strangulation.”).
202
Id. at 590.
196
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“[A]lthough the police discovered the body and arranged for
transport, there is no evidence that the autopsy was done at the
specific request of the police. The medical examiner’s office
performed the autopsy pursuant to state law, just as it would
have if the police had arranged to transport the body of an
accident victim.”203
 “Although [Dr. Choi] was aware that the victim's husband was
in custody and that he had admitted to ‘choking’ her, his
examination could have either incriminated or exonerated him,
depending on what the body revealed about the cause of death .
. . . Dr. Choi was not acting as an agent of law enforcement,
but as one charged with protecting the public health by
determining the cause of a sudden death that might have been
‘suicidal, homicidal or accidental.’”204
 “Unlike a DNA test which might identify a defendant as the
perpetrator of a particular crime, the autopsy finding of
homicide did not directly accuse defendant. Only when the
autopsy findings are viewed in light of defendant’s own
statement to the police is he linked to the crime. In short, the
autopsy sought to determine how the victim died, not who was
responsible, and, thus, Dr. Choi was not defendant’s
accuser.”205
In People v. Dungo, Dungo admitted to choking his girlfriend after
206
a fight. The California Supreme Court held that the expert’s testimony
about the autopsy report did not require confrontation of the report’s
author.207

203

Id. at 591.
Id. at 591-92 (citations omitted).
205
Id. at 592.
206
People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 446 (Cal. 2012).
207
Id. at 450.
204
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“Criminal investigation…[is] only one of several purposes” for
autopsies: “the decedent’s relatives may use an autopsy report
in determining whether to file an action for wrongful death.
And an insurance company may use an autopsy report in
determining whether a particular death is covered by one of its
policies . . . . Also, in certain cases an autopsy report may
satisfy the public’s interest in knowing the cause of death,
particularly when (as here) the death was reported in the local
media. In addition, an autopsy report may provide answers to
grieving family members.”208
 “The presence of a detective at the autopsy and the fact that the
detective told the pathologist about defendant’s confession” did
not make the report testimonial because the report itself was
“simply an official explanation of an unusual death.”209
Finally, in Navarette, a man was shot from a car.210 At issue was
whether the shooter was the car’s driver or passenger Navarette.211 Dr.
Zumwalt, New Mexico’s Chief Medical Examiner, testified using a
colleague’s report that the bullet wound and its lack of soot were
consistent with Navarette’s position in the car.212 This was testimonial,
said the New Mexico’s Supreme Court:
 Dr. Zumwalt “conceded that it was immediately clear that this
autopsy was part of a homicide investigation” and said two
police officers had attended the autopsy.213
Examiners were under a statutory duty to report about individuals who
“die suddenly and unexpectedly,” so there was “no reason” an examiner
should not “anticipate[][ that criminal litigation would result.”214
208

Id.
Dungo, 286 P.3d at 450.
210
State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 436 (N.M. 2013).
211
Id. at 436.
212
Id. at 437.
213
Id. at 44-41.
209
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The court concluded that the pathologist’s findings “went to the issues
of whether Reynaldo’s death was a homicide and, if so, who shot him.
These issues reflected directly on Navarette’s guilt or innocence.”215 This
was declared a bright-line rule: murder autopsies are always testimonial.216
But if an examiner has a decedent and nothing more, how could
her findings possibly reflect directly on Navarette’s guilt or innocence?
How would the pathologist know who Navarette even was? A drowning
could be a crime or a poolside tragedy; a heart attack could be caused by
obesity or arsenic. It is only when a cause-of-death finding is linked to
evidence extraneous to the report that a conviction happens. A body alone
is never enough.
Melendez–Diaz noted that the drug analyst’s job existed “under
Massachusetts law.”217 Courts have followed suit in examining the terms
of autopsy-authorizing statutes, which vary considerably.218 California, for
instance, has three different models among its counties, and a statute
providing that a pathologist’s “[i]nquiry . . . does not include those
investigative functions usually performed by other law enforcement
agencies.”219 In Kansas, a pathologist can obtain “law enforcement
background information” or perform an “examination of the scene of the
cause of death.”220 Statutory provisions are just one element in the totality
inquiry and probably lack the significance courts ascribe to them. A
separate examiner’s office could be muscled by a sheriff, while an

214

Id. at 441.
Id.
216
Id. (holding that “autopsy reports regarding individuals who suffered a violent
death are testimonial.”).
217
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311.
218
For a summary of the variety of systems, see NAS Report, supra note 114, at 24350.
219
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 27491 (West 2012).
220
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-231 (West 2000).
215
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examiner with a lab in a police basement could still maintain perfect
neutral integrity. Statutes say little about what actually happens, such as
the extent to which a pathologist confers with police or family members to
get the facts before an exam. A neutral-sounding name, like “State
Laboratory Institute, a division of the Massachusetts Department of Public
Health” (Melendez-Diaz) or “New Mexico Department of Health,
Scientific Laboratory Division” (Bullcoming), won’t prevent a finding of
testimoniality. Conversely, the fact that the medical examiner is
administratively connected to the police should not automatically render
all of its autopsy reports testimonial—no matter how far they are removed
from police manipulation in practice. Such a rule would put form over
substance.
Melendez-Diaz observed that the “majority of [labs producing
forensic evidence] are administered by law enforcement agencies.”221 Not
so with pathologist operations: 43% of Americans are served by
independent coroner or examiner offices and another 14% by offices
within health departments.222 Some medical examiners are even part of a
university’s school of medicine.223 Most autopsies occur in mortuaries or
hospital pathology wings.
A third of doctors work within law-enforcement bailiwicks, but not
because their work is primarily related to law enforcement—it isn’t—but
for administrative reasons.224 Many rural or suburban counties simply
221

Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318 (“[W]hat respondent calls ‘neutral scientific
testing’ is as neutral or as reliable as respondent suggests. . . . A forensic analyst
responding to a request from a law enforcement official may feel pressure—or have an
incentive—to alter the evidence in a manner favorable to the prosecution.”). For instance,
the Sonoma County, California, Sheriff’s Office website describes its Coroner Unit’s
mission as “to provide competent and timely law enforcement and scientific
investigations of all deaths [under statutory criteria].” Law Enforcement Division,
SONOMA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
http://www.sonomasheriff.org/about_law_enforcement.php (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).
222
NAS Report, supra note 114, at 249.
223
New Mexico v. Navarette, U.S. Supreme Court, Cert. Pet., No. 12-1256, 17-18.
224
NAS Report, supra note 114, at 249.
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can’t afford to separately fund or house examiners and law enforcement.
Mortuaries are costly; insurers don’t cover autopsies. Marin County saved
$500,000 a year by merging its coroner and sheriff’s offices. 225 In real
cost-benefit terms, such a structure probably outweighs confrontation
problems, especially in peaceful places where homicide is rare. The fact is
that when corpses are involved, both law enforcement and examiners must
be too. Federal judges might observe that for similar administrative
reasons their courthouses also host U.S. attorneys, ATF agents, or federal
marshals without compromising the judiciary’s integrity. In any event,
structure is only one factor in a broad-ranging totality inquiry. The
Crawford question is whether any particular statement is primarily
motivated for use in a criminal trial; Bryant shows that even statements
made to law enforcement officers investigating a crime can be nontestimonial. It cannot be that a mere administrative structure tying medical
examiners to law enforcement would make every examiner’s report
testimonial.
We hesitate to suggest that examiners should have no contact with
law enforcement. Pathologists want all available information. Everything
helps. This can mean acquiring police reports—or the reports of
paramedics or firemen, or medical histories and hospital records.
Sometimes it means a pre-autopsy conference with police or a talk with
the victim’s family. New York’s Dr. Helpern—who estimated that he
performed some 20,000 autopsies and supervised 60,000 more over 45
years226—wrote that in cracking the famous Coppolino murders a
witness’s tip that a victim had been injected with succinylcholine, a nearly
undetectable muscle relaxant, was essential. “Had I been doing this
autopsy without knowing the history of the case,” he wrote, he might have
225

Nels Johnson, Marin’s Sheriff-Coroner Consolidation Saves $41,000 a Month,
MARIN INDEPENDENT JOURNAL (May 5, 2013), available at
http://www.marinij.com/ci_23166940/marins-sheriff-coroner-consolidation-saves-41000-month (noting that merger of county coroner into sheriff’s department saves country
a half-million annually and that Marin was 48th county in California county to do so).
226
HELPERN, supra note 79, at 39.
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missed the “tiny pink spot” on the left buttock that marked the needle’s
point of entry.227 His resourceful toxicologist then proceeded to invent a
method to trace the substance in the victim’s organs.228 Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence cannot be so hyper-technical as to impose a rule that
might make medical examiners’ reports thorough and reliable.
In another case, Dr. Helpern explained why believed Ms. Carolee
Biddy, in her day a noted murder defendant, was wrongly convicted.229
Her step-daughter had gotten into a powerful drain cleaner. The
pathologist, unaware of this fact, gave the cause of death as asphyxia,
which it was. But the jury saw it as Ms. Biddy’s doing, when Dr. Helpern,
after studying photos of the girl’s epiglottis, was sure that her throat had
swollen shut from the chemical. Bluntly put, a wall between examiner and
the case’s known facts, besides being pointless in non-criminal cases, will
allow murderers to escape and innocents to suffer. If there remains a
concern about law-enforcement involvement, a solution is to require
pathologists to keep a record of contact with police, so that defense
counsel can later look for improper influence or misrepresentation. If
impropriety is found, a judge can rule on the record that the report carries
the danger of a testimonial statement. But one is more likely to find a
pathologist influencing law enforcement—especially in invalidating a
theory of the detectives or prosecutors—than the other way around.230
There may be other routine and unavoidable involvement by
adversarial officials, such as in delivering the body, but this activity alone

227

HELPERN, supra note 79, at 29, 168, 184, 205-06.
HELPERN, supra note 79, at 31.
229
HELPERN, supra note 79, at 79-83.
230
Interview with Lieutenant R. Bowers, Coroner’s Bureau Unit Commander, in
Alameda Cnty., Cal. (August 7, 2013) (notes on file with author); Interview with Dr.
Thomas Beaver, Chief Forensic Pathologist, in Alameda Cnty., Cal. (August 6, 2013)
(asserting that “pathologists won’t listen to anyone without at least an M.D.”) (notes on
file with author).
228
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cannot make the autopsy report testimonial.231 Nor should a state law like
that in Illinois, which requires an examiner in homicide cases to deliver
specimens from the decedent to the State Police’s Division of Forensic
Services, warrant a finding of testimoniality in all cases. 232 A pathologist’s
obligation to report a homicide finding to police or a district attorney,233
or, conversely, be informed of suspected homicide by police,234 says
precious little about testimoniality. So, too, with laws that allow a state
attorney to request an autopsy.235 A pathologist’s sense that a decedent
with six gunshot wounds will arouse suspicion cannot alone make her
report testimonial. If a vague consciousness on the examiner’s part that a
report could one day show up in criminal prosecution was enough, all
examinations would be testimonial—and that test, of mere anticipation
that a statement might conceivably be used at trial, has already been
rejected by the Supreme Court in Bryant and Davis.236
231

James, 712 F.3d at 102 n.13 (“police were unquestionably involved in the
Guyanese autopsy process, including, for example, transporting forensic samples for
testing. As five Justices in Williams made clear, however, the involvement of ‘adversarial
officials’ in an investigation is not dispositive as to whether or not a statement is
testimonial. In this case, it appears that was simply the routine procedure employed by
the Guyanese medical examiner in investigating all unnatural deaths, and does not
indicate that a criminal investigation was contemplated.”).
232
Leach, 980 N.E.2d at 591 (citing 55 ILCS 5/3–3013 (West 2010)).
233
See, e.g., Navarette, 294 P.3d at 440-41 (“A medical examiner obligated to report
her findings to the district attorney should know that her statements may be used in future
criminal litigation.”) (referencing N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-11-8 (West 1973)).
234
James, 712 F.3d at 97-98 (“While the OCME is an independent agency, the police
are required to notify it when someone has died ‘from criminal violence, by accident, by
suicide, suddenly when in apparent health, when unattended by a physician, in a
correctional facility or in any suspicious or unusual manner or where an application is
made pursuant to law for a permit to cremate a body of a person.’”).
235
Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1231-32 (holding that a medical examiner is obligated to
perform autopsies “as shall be requested by the state attorney,” among other
circumstances).
236
See also Leach, 980 N.E.2d at 593 (“[A]n autopsy report prepared in the normal
course of business of a medical examiner’s office is not rendered testimonial merely
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To assure that autopsy report avoid the Confrontation Clause’s
prohibition, statutes and protocols should provide that pathologists receive
no guidance from police beyond the receipt of basic facts and no specifics
about the identity of possible perpetrators. Examiners should have no
responsibility for gathering evidence or discovering perpetrators. A report
might properly reference a “subarachnoid hemorrhage,” as one did, but it
should not have mentioned the beating at the parking lot.237 (If a reference
to outside facts creeps in, redact it.) Pathologists should be cautious about
visiting a murder scene—uncommon anyway once “medical investigators”
assumed this role—an act that risks police-doctor contact. Reports should
be non-accusatory and devoid of legal conclusions. As put by the National
Association of Medical Examiners, the task is to produce a “neutral and
objective medical assessment of the cause and manner of death.”238 The
concern is accuracy guided by the best professional standards.239
Following these standards helps an examiner’s report avoid being
entramelled in Bryant’s “primary motive” test.

because the assistant medical examiner performing the autopsy is aware that police
suspect homicide and that a specific individual might be responsible.”).
237
Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770, 772 (1st. Cir 1990).
238
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, supra note 122 at A1, 1. See
also United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 332 (2d Cir. 1993) (A “medical examiner,
although often called a forensic expert” should “bear[] more similarity to a treating
physician than he does to one who is merely rendering an opinion for use in the trial of a
case.”) Or, as the California Supreme Court put it, “statements describing the
pathologist’s anatomical and physiological observations,” by contrast to “conclusions as
to the cause of the victim’s death” are “comparable to observations of objective fact in a
report by a physician who, after examining a patient, diagnoses a particular injury or
ailment and determines the appropriate treatment.” Dungo, 286 P.3d at 449 (citing
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 312 n.2 (“medical reports created for treatment purposes . . .
would not be testimonial under our decision today”) (emphasis added)).
239
Especially, perhaps, if the result requires a division of labor. Williams, 132 S. Ct.
at 2244 (“When the work of a lab is divided up in such a way, it is likely that the sole
purpose of each technician is simply to perform his or her task in accordance with
accepted procedures.).
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B. CERTIFY OR SEAL THE REPORT WITH AN OATH?
A report’s formality came up in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming—
the cases discussed the certified character of the lab reports240—but in
Williams whether the Cellmark data was formally presented seemed
chiefly of interest to Justice Thomas. Eight Williams votes viewed
Thomas’s single-factor “formality” test an overtechnical basis upon which
to decide testimoniality—“label[ing],” according to Justice Kagan, that
made “(maybe) a nickel’s worth of difference.”241 Justice Thomas would
allow admission even of accusatory statements so long as they lack
solemnity.242 In Melendez-Diaz, he felt the certificates indicating cocaine
were “quite plainly affidavits,”243 as he did in Bullcoming with the lab’s
“certificate of analyst.”244 Yet in Williams he found the lab statements
“neither a sworn nor a certified declaration of fact.”245
If Justice Thomas’s test were accepted, a prosecutor might be able
to admit autopsy reports that were signed but not formally certified. In
California,246 four justices seemed to find it significant that although a
pathologist “signed and dated his autopsy report, it was not sworn or
240

Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710 (“question presented is whether the Confrontation
Clause permits the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a
testimonial certification”).
241
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2276 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
242
Id. at 2261 (Thomas, J., concurring).
243
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 329-30 (Thomas, J., concurring).
244
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710.
245
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring).
246
Dungo, 286 P.3d at 450 (“the presence of a detective at the autopsy and the fact
that the detective told the pathologist about defendant's confession do not make the
statements of objective fact in the autopsy report into formal and solemn testimony; but
those circumstances do support defendant’s argument that the primary purpose of the
autopsy was the investigation of a crime. Similarly, the fact that the autopsy was
mandated by a statute that required public findings and notification of law enforcement
does not imply that the statements of objective fact in the report are formal and solemn
testimony, but it does imply that the primary purpose of the autopsy was forensic.”).
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certified in a manner comparable to the chemical analyses in Melendez–
Diaz and Bullcoming.”247 The Illinois Supreme Court (the other high court
to find autopsy reports generally non-testimonial) noted that unlike the
Melendez–Diaz certificates, the autopsy report it considered “was not
certified or sworn in anticipation of its being used as evidence; it was
merely signed by the doctor who performed [it].”248 Still, a factor rejected
by eight justices as significant (let alone controlling) counsels caution in
preparing unformalized autopsy reports in the expectation that they will
thereby avoid confrontation problems. The best that can be hoped for by
the government is that a lack of formality would support a finding of nontestimoniality. This should be far less significant (and is in the case law)
than the question of whether the medical examiner was influenced by law
enforcement to make the autopsy report a document for litigation.
C. EXPERT TESTIMONY
If an autopsy report is testimonial, can one doctor testify using the
work of another? This practice is a real problem for defendants. In
Ignasiak, for instance, “Dr. Minyard indicated she lacked enough
information to agree or disagree with Dr. Kelly’s conclusion that patient
S.P.’s death was a suicide”249 and “could not testify from direct
knowledge about the condition of a particular patient’s heart, lungs or
brain and, as a result, whether that patient may have actually died from a

247

Dungo, 286 P.3d at 452. The court further noted that the autopsy report “contrasts
in this respect with the coroner’s or attending physician’s “[c]ertification and signature”
on a death certificate, by which the declarant “attest[s] to [the] accuracy” of “the portion
of the certificate setting forth the cause of death (citing Health & Saf. Code, § 102875,
subd. (a)(7)). . . . [T]he two documents, autopsy report and death certificate, are distinct,
and only the latter bears a formal certification mandated by statute.” Id. at 452.
248
Leach, 980 N.E.2d at 592. See also Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 431 (“the autopsy
report, which was unsworn, cannot fairly be viewed as ‘formalized testimonial
material.’”).
249
Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1225.
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heart attack, stroke, or some cause other than drug overdose.”250 A nonautopsying expert will be able speak to procedure, highlighting an office’s
diligence and expertise, but not about the one-off errors and oversights
that are precisely what the defense seeks to uncover.
Justice-counting in Williams leads to the conclusion that
unadmitted autopsy reports, if testimonial, cannot serve as the basis for the
opinion of an expert who played no role in the autopsy,251 even if the
testimony is the expert’s own independent conclusion and he can be crossexamined about it.252 The New Mexico Supreme Court believes this was
decided253 by Justices Thomas and Kagan in Williams, the latter rejecting
250

Id. at 1234.
The viability of using Federal Rule of Evidence 703 or state analogues was still
an open question after Bullcoming. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“We would face a different question if asked to determine the
constitutionality of allowing an expert witness to discuss others’ testimonial statements if
the testimonial statements were not themselves admitted as evidence.”); Moore, 651 F.3d
at 72 (“Bullcoming . . . only considered a testifying lab technician who had ‘no
involvement whatsoever in the relevant test and report.’”). Courts certainly approved of
this route before Melendez-Diaz. Craig, 853 N.E.2d at 637 (determining that there was no
unavailability requirement with expert autopsy testimony).
252
Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d at 921 (“[A]s to the opinions regarding the non-fatal stab
wounds and tire markings, it is equally clear that these are original observations and
opinions developed by Dr. Sabet himself. Dr. Sabet unequivocally testified that these
were additional opinions he derived from inspection of the clothing and autopsy
photographs; they are mentioned nowhere in the autopsy report itself”); United States v.
Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Crawford forbids the introduction of
testimonial hearsay as evidence in itself, but it in no way prevents expert witnesses from
offering their independent judgments merely because those judgments were in some part
informed by their exposure to otherwise inadmissible evidence”); Lackey, 120 P.3d at
352 (“Dr. Mitchell based his opinions and conclusions upon photographs, a toxicology
report, and the death certificate which was prepared by the coroner who provided
corroborating testimony at trial.”).
253
Navarette, 294 P.3d at 441 (“[T]he autopsy report was not admitted into evidence.
Thus, the issue here is whether an expert can relate out-of-court statements to the jury
that provide the basis for his or her opinion, as long as the written statements themselves
are not introduced.”).
251
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such testimony as a “neat trick.”254 Precedents already disallow
“surrogate” testimony255 or testimony that is a “mere conduit” for
inadmissible evidence.256 The logic, per Melendez-Diaz, is that
confrontation lets a defendant test “honesty, proficiency, and
methodology”257—even when examiners boast the “scientific acumen of
Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Theresa.”258 Justices Alito,
Kennedy, and Breyer, and Chief Justice Roberts disagree: expert
statements made “solely for the purpose of explaining the assumptions on

254

Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2259 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2272 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“[U]nder the plurality’s approach, the prosecutor could choose the analystwitness of his dreams (as the judge here said, “the best DNA witness I have ever heard”),
offer her as an expert (she knows nothing about the test, but boasts impressive degrees),
and have her provide testimony identical to the best the actual tester might have given
(“the DNA extracted from the vaginal swabs matched Sandy Williams’s”)—all so long as
a state evidence rule says that the purpose of the testimony is to enable the factfinder to
assess the expert opinion’s basis…. What a neat trick—but really, what a way to run a
criminal justice system. No wonder five Justices reject it.”).
255
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710.
256
Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d at 920-22, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710; Ignasiak, 667
F.3d at 1234. See also Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276 (“[W]e do not think it conceivable that
the protections of the Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by having a note-taking
policeman recite the unsworn hearsay testimony of the declarant, instead of having the
declarant sign a deposition.”); United States v. Pablo, 625 F.3d 1285, 1292 (10th Cir.
2010) (“If an expert simply parrots another individual’s testimonial hearsay, rather than
conveying her independent judgment that only incidentally discloses testimonial hearsay .
. . then the expert is, in effect, disclosing the testimonial hearsay for its substantive truth
and she becomes little more than a backdoor conduit for otherwise inadmissible
testimonial hearsay”); State v. Aragon, 225 P.3d 1280, 1290 (N.M. 2010) (“Young’s
testimony was a restatement of Champagne’s conclusory opinion regarding the narcotic
content of the substance, its weight, and its purity as stated in her hearsay report. . . .
[Aragon] had a right to challenge the judgment and conclusions behind Champagne’s
opinion.”).
257
Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1233 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 320).
258
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 319 n.6.; Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714 (holding that
only testimony by person who actually prepared the forensic report has the insight needed
to “expose any lapses or lies on [the certifying analyst’s] part.”).
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which that opinion rests are not offered for their truth.”259 That’s only four
votes. The better path is to admit autopsy reports directly, as nontestimonial report under the “primary motive” test, after assuring that lawenforcement involvement is not so pervasive as to prevent a finding that
the report was prepared for purposes unrelated to use as evidence in a
criminal trial.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE PROPER TEST
There is no “autopsy” exception to the Confrontation Clause. We
think, rather, that the vast majority of autopsy reports are just outside the
clause’s scope—presumptively non-testimonial in light of a medical
examiner’s actual work. Reliability can’t justify unconfronted admission;
nor can neutrality, or the state’s need for the evidence, or the fact the
autopsies cannot be recreated. What is enough are statistics showing that
at least 90% of autopsy reports in fact do not have a primary purpose in
furnishing evidence for a prosecution. The primary purpose, the
predominating purpose, is public health. Even in the fraction of cases
where a report is eventually used in a prosecution, that doesn’t mean the
report was prepared for such a purpose.
Courts should presume that autopsy reports are non-testimonial
because they are written independently by neutral doctors concerned with
accuracy, not police officers seeking conviction. The presumption isn’t
overcome by the fact that the examiner and the police might be
administratively conjoined. The proper test for the Confrontation Clause,
fairly applied, is:
Has been specific and pervasive involvement by law
enforcement in the preparation of the autopsy report, such
as to change the basic character of the document from one
serving pathological purposes to one serving prosecutorial
purposes?
259

Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228.
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Only when that line is crossed does a medical examiner becomes a
“witness” against the accused. Defense allegations that this happened
should be litigated in light of a record of contacts kept by the medical
examiner.
Of course the state cannot generate evidence against the accused
without the right of confrontation. The Founders removed that damnable
weapon from the arsenal. But to demand confrontation of every autopsy
report in a prosecution would be to misinterpret a noble principle and
would very likely subvert justice before promoting it. This is an
exceedingly unstable area of law. The proper application of the
Confrontation Clause does not command a majority in the Supreme Court
or consensus in the states. Which means there is still time to do the right
thing.

